


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
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AFGHANISTAN

20 April 1955



- I. Afghan-Pakistani crisis currently stalemated; next move by Afghans is key to further developments.
  - A. Crisis began with 29 Mar belligerent pro-Pushtoonistan speech by Afghan prime minister Daud (see background on Pushto problem).
    - 1. Daud predicted "disorder" because of Pak merger Western provinces into single unit (move reduces tribal autonomy).
  - B. "Disorder" arrived on schedule--in next three days, there were riots in Kabul (which wrecked Pak embassy), demonstrations in Kandahar, Jalalabad (where Paks have consulates).
  - C. Foreign observers agree "disorders" government-inspired: numerous signs advance preparation.
  - D. Assumption is they were work of Daud.
    - 1. Probably effort demonstrate his strength, enlist support.
    - 2. Daud under growing pressure to curtail his program of increased economic ties with USSR.
- II. Early reports said USSR had incited rioters.
  - A. This raised fears that Soviet, after year-long economic penetration program, was becoming openly involved in situation.

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- B. Strong Pak reaction also raised spectre foreign intervention from that quarter.
    - 1. Paks made reprisal attack on Afghan consulate Peshawar 1 Apr.
    - 2. Pak government suggested to US that Daud and whole Afghan royal family be removed.
  - C. Finally, "disorders" were followed by reports that tribal elements in both Pakistan and Afghanistan were on move toward Kabul--raising possibility of major tribal unrest.
- III. However, present situation offers prospect for peaceful solution--at least in short run.
- A. Tribal movements squelched, no sign of immediate recurrence.
  - B. Situation in Kabul, other Afghan towns quiet; government apparently in full control.
  - C. Danger of Pak intervention, overthrow royal family, apparently subsided. 25X6B
    - 1. 
    - 2. Paks now doing utmost maintain quiet atmosphere in Pakistan.
  - D. Reports of Soviet involvement not confirmed, and prospect for intervention unlikely.
    - 1. Overt Soviet activity limited to a few press and radio releases favorable to Afghans.

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2. One press report (NY Times' Callahan, from Karachi) now admitted by writer to be "invention" to give fresh lead to old story.

E. Actual Soviet aim believed long-range economic penetration.

1. Value of forcefully seized Afghanistan to USSR probably not worth risk of alienation neutralists (including India), or risk of speeding Western arms aid to Iran, Pakistan.
2. Only direct intervention by Paks, or chaos created by tribal uprising, likely to change Soviet view.

IV. Future therefore seems to depend on Afghans.

A. Weight of present scanty evidence suggests Prime Minister Daud will be "disciplined" to save face of country, royal family.

B. "Disciplining" would consist either of removal from office or retention on promise of good behavior.

1. If Daud removed, situation likely to return to normal.
2. If Daud remains, either as victor of struggle for power or on sufferance, short-range outlook probably still not alarming.
3. Daud probably cowed somewhat by strong diplomatic protests over March incidents: also worried over fact that all tribal movements following incidents

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were toward Kabul, rather than Pakistan, with  
looting of Afghan capital allegedly upper-  
most in tribesmen's minds.

- C. Longer-range outlook less good, because headstrong  
Daud likely eventually to act in manner inimical to  
West, despite any promises he may give royal family.
1. In next few years, death or incapacitation of  
aging royal uncles will remove last restraining  
element on Daud, permit him to control govern-  
ment by dominating king.

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